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The role of periods and terms as time categories at different stages of the mechanism 
of legal regulation of personal property and non-property (civil) relations is studied in the 
paper; the author’s position that being a time form of development of civil legal relations, 
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terms do not occupy an independent place in the general system of legal facts and produce 
legal consequences only in connection with of action and events is substantiated.
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The dynamic development of eco-
nomic processes and social transforma-
tions in modern Ukraine is based on the 
active use of time as an objective cate-
gory and related concepts of “period”, 
“term”, “timely” and so on.
What place these categories occupy 
in the mechanism of legal regulation of 
civil relations – personal non-property 
and property, based on legal equality, 
free expression of will and property in-
dependence of their participants?
In legal literature different opinions 
have been mentioned on the nature and 
elements (stages) of the mechanism of 
legal regulation of social relations. With-
out analyzing these opinions, it should 
be noted that most researchers agree that 
the mechanism of legal regulation in-
cludes the following elements (stages): 
1) a regulatory basis; 2) legal facts; 3) le-
gal relations; 4) acts of realization of 
rights and obligations; 5) protection of 
violated rights of legal relations subjects.
A common prerequisite for the emer-
gence and existence of corporate rela-
tions is the granting by law corporate 
legal capacity of their subjects, that is, 
the ability to have and exercise corporate 
rights and obligations.
General temporal parameters of legal 
relations functioning are determined pri-
marily by legal norms. Provisions on 
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Civil (Civil Code), Commercial (Com-
mercial Code), Land (Land Code) of 
Ukraine, in numerous other normative-
legal acts, as well as in the norms of 
other social regulators (business cus-
toms, legal practices, etc.) governing 
civil relations of their participants. Lim-
ited in time are not only legal relations 
as a whole, but also subjective rights and 
obligations which make up the content 
of these relations. The legal rights and 
obligations established in the legal rela-
tions provide for the possibility of their 
subjects to take certain actions aimed at 
achieving legitimate goals. Therefore, 
the regulation of action in time of subjec-
tive rights and obligations is an impor-
tant mean of legal influence on the be-
havior of participants in civil relations.
The terms regulate the civil turnover, 
stabilize the civil legal relations, contrib-
ute to the timely and qualitative satisfac-
tion of the needs of their participants, 
provide for timely protection of the vio-
lated subjective rights and interests of 
the participants of civil relations.
Provisions on periods and terms per-
meate almost all sub-spheres and institu-
tions of civil law. The issue on periods 
and terms is important methodologically 
not only for civil law, but also for under-
standing the relevant time concepts while 
applying the rules of family, land, envi-
ronmental, commercial and other fields 
of law.
Different levels and forms of matter’s 
movement correspond to certain forms 
of time reflection. The papers by phi-
losophers have convincingly proved the 
possibility of the existence in the world 
of various spatio-temporal forms, which 
differ from other forms in that they are 
necessary conditions for the existence of 
numerous classes of material objects. 
Such forms include social space and so-
cial time.
Social time is a form of social matter 
existence, a form of social being. Social 
processes and phenomena, human activ-
ity in general occur in time. They de-
velop in a certain sequence and have 
some duration. These features are inher-
ent to all phenomena of the material 
world. The specificity of social time as 
a form of social matter movement is that 
it is imprinted by the dialectical connec-
tion of existing only of objective and 
subjective, necessity and freedom in so-
ciety. Social connections and relations, 
constituting the content of social time, 
arise on the basis of the activity that 
people do. Although the spatial-temporal 
forms determining them appear objec-
tively, the awareness of the latter by hu-
mans in the context of society becomes 
one of the important factors in the scien-
tific management of social processes.
The question on the role and place of 
periods in the mechanism of legal regu-
lation can be considered in several ways: 
a) period as the moment of origin (begin-
ning) or termination of legal relations; 
b) term as one of the conditions that de-
termines their content; c) term as a cri-
teria of the legitimacy (timeliness) of the 
behavior of legal relations participants, 
etc.
In civil law literature, while analyz-
ing periods, the latter are most often 
identified in view of their place in the 
system of legal facts. Legal facts gener-
ally are considered as such facts of real-
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ity that a law refers with the occurrence 
of certain legal consequences, such as 
the occurrence, changing or termination 
of rights and legal obligations.
Legal facts are classified according 
to different characteristics. One such fea-
tures is the relation of law to these facts. 
In accordance with the specifics of the 
matter and method of legal regulation 
inherent in each sphere of law, its rules 
and institutions provide for certain types 
of legal facts. Such classification con-
tributes to clarify the content of the 
spheres of law and to distinguish them. 
Regardless of their sphere, legal facts are 
divided into actions and events on the 
basis of their relation to the will of the 
subjects. If actions (inactivity) are per-
formed according to the human’s will 
and are acts of conscious behavior, then 
events are phenomena that in their de-
velopment do not depend on the will of 
people. In addition to the traditional clas-
sification of legal facts on the basis of 
volition feature into actions and events, 
the opinion was expressed on the expedi-
ency of separating a group of legal facts-
states, and depending on their duration, 
to distinguish: a) facts of a single action; 
b) continuing legal facts-states.
It should be noted that the classifica-
tion of legal facts on the basis of their 
duration is quite acceptable, since it con-
tributes to a deeper studyiung of them, 
in particular in view of their effect over 
time. Actions and events themselves can 
have different duration in time. The 
question on classifying states as a sepa-
rate type of legal facts has its own his-
tory in science and remains debatable. 
Examples of frequently mentioned facts-
states (marriages, family relations, 
etc.) are nothing but legal relationships 
that have arisen as a result of certain le-
gal facts-actions or events (including 
marriage). Regarding the separation of 
activity and its results into a separate 
group of legal facts, it can be warned that 
the activity consists of individual actions 
of people and their collectives, some of 
which are given legal importance by the 
law, that is, recognizing as legal facts.
The list of legal facts-grounds for the 
emergence of civil rights and obligations 
(Article 11 of the Civil Code) due toe the 
civil law principles of analogy of law and 
the analogy of law (Article 8 of the Civ-
il Code) is not exhaustive.
Legal periods are most often regard-
ed as events, referring to the passage of 
time (period). For example, O. O. Krasav-
chikov allocated time movement in a 
separate group of absolute legal events, 
the occurrence and action of which are 
not caused by the willful activity of peo-
ple [1]. The same assessment legal pe-
riod obtained in the Ukrainian textbooks 
on civil law [2]. Denying O. O. Krasav-
chikov, who argued that over time, a 
person can not oppose his/her activity, 
because one exists in time, V. P. Hry-
bachev correctly emphasized that a per-
son actively uses time in one’s activity.
Given the role that time plays in the 
emergence, changing, exercising and 
protection of civil rights, V. P. Hrybanov 
concluded that legal periods in the sys-
tem of legal facts of civil law occupy an 
independent place, along with legal 
events and legal actions and represent 
something in between by their nature [3].
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legal nature of periods in law, it is im-
portant, first of all, to determine the rela-
tion of periods to the will of subjects 
civil legal relations. A period as a prede-
termined time or a length of time limits 
the duration of the subjective rights and 
obligations. Because these rights and 
obligations are most often caused by the 
will of their carriers, so are the will’s 
nature that have a period that limits their 
effect in time. Specific periods of imple-
mentation, and especially periods of pro-
tection of civil rights are set by the pro-
visions of the law. However, the law it-
self has a willful character as a legal 
expression of state will. The mechanism 
of action of normative prescriptions is 
most often “switched on” (except the 
occurrence of legal events) through the 
implementation of conscious and pur-
poseful willful actions (deals, acts of 
public authorities, etc.), which influence 
on the dynamics of civil legal relations.
The period can be determined by the 
parties of the legal relations themselves, 
established by court decision. The willful 
nature of this period cannot be doubted. 
If no period is specified through the men-
tioned way, the parties are guided by the 
time criteria set out in the law. Periods 
set by the law become obligatory to sub-
jects of legal relations either because the 
law forbids them to change according to 
the agreement of the parties (such as 
limitation), or because the parties have 
not used the opportunity given to them 
to set the period at their own discretion 
(e.g. to increase warranty period).
Thus, civil law periods are a tempo-
rary form of civil law relations develop-
ment, a form of existence and exercise 
(fulfillment) of subjective rights and ob-
ligations that make up the content of le-
gal relations. Subjective right and obliga-
tion represent the ability or necessity to 
commit or withhold certain actions by 
their bearers. The content of the period 
is either an action or an event (events 
also occur over time, and may have a 
certain duration). Outside of these facts, 
the setting and existence of periods are 
meaningless. That is why the onset or 
expiration of the period takes on signifi-
cance, not in itself, but in combination 
with the events or actions for which the 
period is set. From the mentioned above 
it can be concluded that the periods do 
not occupy an independent place in the 
general system of legal facts, along with 
legal actions and legal events. Time is 
peculiar to the first and the second as a 
form. Therefore, acting as a temporal 
form in which events and actions (inac-
tivity) are occurred, periods produce le-
gal consequences only in relation with 
actions and events. Taking it into ac-
count, a period is defined as the time 
point with the onset or end of it is associ-
ated with event or action (inactivity) that 
is legally relevant [4].
M. V. Batyanov does not agree with 
a clear position, considering that 
V. V. Lutz analyzes the period only as a 
form of existence of phenomena of real 
reality, which have legal meaning, and 
does not differentiate the course of the 
period and its end (onset). Period can act 
in law as, for example, a temporal char-
acteristic, which can hardly be regarded 
as a form of any phenomenon. However, 
in a further statement M. V. Batyanov 
states that any legal period is always con-
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sidered in connection with a particular 
legal phenomenon as a peculiar point of 
attachment to it. Therefore, the period 
cannot be regarded as a legal fact, be-
cause in the opposite approach it should 
be attributed to legal facts-states. How-
ever, in such a case, the legal conse-
quences are not caused by the period 
itself, but by the phenomenon or process 
to which the period occurs. By itself, the 
duration of period isn’t available to cause 
any independent legal consequences [5].
As M. D. Pleniuk rightly points out, 
the period is a separate legal phenome-
non that is closely linked with one or 
another legal facts (actions or events). 
Unlike a legal fact, which is an indepen-
dent category, the period (term) does not 
exist by itself, but is a temporary reflec-
tion of the existence of certain actions or 
events (legal facts) [6].
In Ukrainian legal terminology, along 
with the concept “period” (which reflects 
a certain period in time (e.g. year, 
month), the concept “term” is often used 
to refer to a specific point in time, such 
as a calendar date or a specific event that 
should come. Therefore, the Civil Code 
of Ukraine separately defines the terms 
“period” and “term”. According to Ar-
ticle 251 of the Civil Code, a period is 
recognized as a period of time, with the 
end of which a certain action or event 
having legal significance is connected. 
In that case period is calculated by years, 
months, weeks, days or hours. The be-
ginning or the end of a period could also 
be defined by an indication of an event 
that must inevitably occur. A concept of 
a term defines a moment in time that is 
associated with an action or event of le-
gal significance. Term is defined by a 
calendar date or by an indication of an 
event that must inevitably come.
P. D. Guivan, analyzing the definition 
of the period, which is given in Part 1 of 
Art. 251 of the Civil Code, considers it 
to be imperfect, because it gives a wide 
range for its interpretation. The author 
states the position that the beginning or 
end of the period cannot be considered 
as a legal fact in the classical sense of 
the circumstance as such, which leads to 
the emergence, change or termination of 
subjective civil rights and obligations, 
and proposes to set out Part 1 of Art. 251 
of the Civil Code in the following word-
ing: “The period is a certain period of 
time, the onset or expiration of which 
determine the limits of existence (exer-
cise) of the subjective right of a person”. 
Accordingly, the part 2 of Art. 251 of the 
Civil Code also should be changed [7, p. 
140–141].
However, it should be noted that, 
first, the period could be linked not only 
to subjective civil law, but also to a sub-
jective civil obligation, which is not 
mentioned in that definition of the peri-
od, and, second, the onset and the expira-
tion of the period cannot be considered 
as a limit of the existence or the exercise 
of the subjective right of the person, be-
cause, as a general rule (with the excep-
tion of truncated ones), the expiration of 
the period provided for the exercise of a 
right or of a duty, does not cause the au-
tomatic termination of that right or duty, 
because their ability remains for imple-
mentation and defense during a specified 
period of time in an expeditious, de-
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dispute.
Emphasizing the necessity to distin-
guish the concepts “period” and “term”, 
it should be noted at the same time about 
their interaction, combination in the 
regulation of certain civil relations. Thus, 
according to Art. 530 of the Civil Code 
of Ukraine, if the obligation set a period 
(term) for its fulfillment, it must be ful-
filled within that period (term). An obli-
gation, the period (term) of which is 
specified by an indication of an event 
which must inevitably occur, should be 
enforced upon the occurrence of that 
event. If the period (term) of the debtor’s 
obligation has not been set or determined 
at the time of the claim, the creditor has 
the right to demand its execution at any 
time. The debtor must fulfill such an ob-
ligation within seven days from the date 
of the claim, if the obligation of immedi-
ate execution does not follow from the 
contract or acts of civil legislation.
The vast majority of property and 
personal non-property relations gov-
erned by the provisions of the Civil Code 
and other acts of civil legislation are re-
lations, which ensure the proper conduct 
of the subjects of these relations, the 
normal exercise of their subjective civil 
rights and the fulfillment of civil obliga-
tions.
Periods (terms) in a regulatory legal 
relations are periods (terms) for the ex-
ercise of subjective civil rights and the 
fulfillment of obligations.
For some civil relations, the law pro-
vides that failure to exercise a right or an 
obligations during a specified period or 
term will result in the termination of that 
right or obligation. Such periods in the 
literature are called truncated, or preclu-
sive (from the Latin. preaclusio – to sus-
pend, to impede). The Civil Code of 
Ukraine and other acts of civil legislation 
provide for many different truncated pe-
riods. Thus, according to Part 1 of Art. 
247 and Part 1 of Art. 248 of the Civil 
Code the period of the power of attorney 
is defined in the power of attorney itself. 
If its period is not specified, the power 
of attorney shall remain in force until 
terminated. Representation on the power 
of attorney shall be terminated if the 
power of attorney expires. Therefore, the 
period of the power of attorney is a trun-
cated period, because with its expiration 
the right of the representative to act on 
behalf of the person he/she represents 
expires.
It should be noted that the peculiari-
ties of truncated periods is that, they, 
while defining the limits of subjective 
right in time, are included in its content 
as an internally important limit of their 
existence. The expiration of the trun-
cated period causes the termination of 
the subjective right or obligation, but it 
cannot be considered a premature termi-
nation of the subjective right. It is about 
premature termination or fulfillment of 
a duty in case it has taken place before 
the expiration. Instead, the right or obli-
gation limited by the truncated period 
ceases at the time of the expiration of the 
period. But the truncated nature of one 
or another period should directly follow 
from the content of the relevant provi-
sion of the law or the contract.
The term “reasonable period” refers 
to evaluation concepts that are abundant 
in many rules of the Civil Code, but it 
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does not contain a general rule in which 
the meaning of this concept would be 
disclosed.
In common law countries (including 
the United States, England), a reasonable 
period is associated with an assessment 
of the actions and circumstances in 
which they are committed. Thus, accord-
ing to the § 2 Art. 1–204 of the United 
States Uniform Commercial Code, defin-
ing of a reasonable period for commiting 
an action depends on the nature and pur-
pose of the action and the circumstances 
surrounding it. In English law, perfor-
mance within a reasonable period is con-
sidered as being made taking into ac-
count the nature of the contract and the 
circumstances of the case given. What is 
a reasonable period is an issue of fact in 
each case [8].
The final, optional stage of the mech-
anism of legal regulation is the protec-
tion of violated civil rights and obliga-
tions of the subjects of civil law rela-
tions.
According to Art. 15 and I6 (part 
1) of the Civil Code of Ukraine, every 
person has the right to defend his/her 
civil right in the case of its violation, 
non-recognition or contestation, as well 
as ones interest, which does not contra-
dict the general principles of civil legis-
lation. However, the possibility of de-
manding a competent body to protect a 
right or an interest provided for by the 
law is also not infinite in time: as a gen-
eral rule, it is limited by statutory limita-
tion periods. The purpose of the latter is 
not only to recognize as existing, to re-
store a subjective right or legal obliga-
tion or to protect them in other ways, but 
also to ensure the realization of the sub-
jective right and to satisfy the interests 
of the empowered person.
According to Art. 256 of the Civil 
Code the statute of limitations is a period 
within which a person can apply to the 
court for the protection of ones civil right 
or interest. The aforementioned provi-
sion is somewhat unsuccessful, since it 
gives reasons to believe that with the 
expiration of the limitation period a per-
son cannot apply to court.
The statute of limitations should not 
be considered as a period within which 
a person can go to court in order to claim 
his/her violated right. According to Part 
2 of Art. 267 of the Civil Code, the ap-
plication for protection of civil right or 
interest must be accepted by the court for 
consideration regardless of the expira-
tion of the limitation period. It is said that 
during the limitation period a person may 
rely on the compulsory defense of his/
her violated civil right or interest by a 
court. The expiry of the statute of limita-
tions, the application of which the party 
mentioned in the dispute, is the basis for 
denial of the claim (Part 4 of Art. 267 of 
the Civil Code). The term “statute of 
limitations” reflects the connection, on 
the one hand, with the form of the vio-
lated rights protection (lawsuit), and on 
the other – with the duration of the right 
protection in time (statute of limitations).
The statute of limitation is an institu-
tion of substantive, but not procedural 
civil law. The limitation period of the 
right to sue means only the possibility to 
obtain compulsory protection of the vio-
lated subjective right by a judicial au-
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apply to the court or other body for pro-
tection of violated or disputed rights and 
interests protected by law at any time, 
Part 2 of Art. 267 of the Civil Code pro-
vides that claims for the protection of the 
violated right are accepted by the court 
regardless of the statute of limitations 
expiration. However, if while studying 
the dispute it is found that the statute of 
limitations have expired before the claim 
is filed and its application is declared by 
the party of the dispute, then it is a 
ground for refusing to satisfy it.
The Chairman of the Supreme Court 
of Ukraine Ya. M. Romaniuk has asked 
the Scientific Research Institute of Pri-
vate Law and Entrepreneurship named 
after Academician F. G. Burchak of the 
National Academy of Legal Sciences of 
Ukraine to submit a scientific conclusion 
on the correct application of the provi-
sions of Art. 17 of the Law of Ukraine 
“On Mortgage” in interconnection with 
Art. 266, 267, 509, 598 of the Civil Code 
of Ukraine in the disputed legal relations 
that arose in such circumstances.
A loan agreement was made between 
the Bank and N. according to the provi-
sions of which the Bank provided N. 
money through a credit. In order to en-
sure the obligations under this agree-
ment, N. transferred to the Bank a real 
estate object, a mortgage agreement was 
concluded on it between them.
In November 2013, the Bank filed a 
lawsuit to the debtor (mortgagee N.) to 
recover the amount of debt on the loan 
agreement, as well as to recover the 
mortgage. The decision of the court of 
first instance, which came into force, 
denied the Bank’s claim in full due to the 
statute of limitations expiry. On the basis 
of this court decision, N. considered that 
his/her mortgage obligation to the Bank 
had ceased, and appealed to the court to 
terminate the mortgage.
As it can be seen from the content of 
the legal relations with regard to the pro-
vided loans in this case, the borrower did 
not repay the loan received in due time, 
in connection with which the Bank sued 
the debtor as a mortgagee to recover the 
amount of debt under the loan agreement 
and to recover the mortgage which was 
transferred by the debtor to the Bank in 
order to ensure the obligations under the 
contract. Due to the expiry of the limita-
tion period, the court correctly denied 
the claim completely against both the 
main debt under the loan agreement and 
the claims under the mortgage agree-
ment.
Systemic analysis of Art. 17 of the 
Law of Ukraine “On Mortgage” and Art. 
266, 267, 509, 598 of the Civil Code of 
Ukraine in the context of the given case 
gives reasons for such conclusions. Ac-
cording to Part 4 of Art. 267 of the Civ-
il Code, the statute of limitations expiry, 
the application of which was declared by 
the party in the dispute, is the basis for 
refusing the claim. But does the obliga-
tion with substantive-legal requirements 
remain valid and binding to the parties, 
or does it terminate? Various opinions 
have been expressed in literature about 
that issue. The main argument is the ref-
erence to Part 1 of Art. 267 of the Civil 
Code on the fact that the person who 
fulfilled the obligation after the expira-
tion of the limitation period has no right 
to demand the return of the accom-
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plished, even if at the moment of execu-
tion one did not know about the limita-
tion period expiration. The so-called 
theory of natural obligations emerged on 
this basis. Natural obligations are those 
which do not give the creditor any right 
to demand their enforcement, and there-
fore their couty protection, but the debt-
or misses the opportunity to return ev-
erything that was voluntarily given or 
paid in connection with their perfor-
mance after the expiration of the statute 
of limitations [9].
Therefore, the denial of the claim due 
to the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions does not lead to the termination of 
the obligation in relation to the main re-
quirements as well as to the additional 
requirements aimed at securing the main 
obligation. There is a certain inconsis-
tency between the general rule of the 
Civil Code (Part 1 of Article 267) and 
the special Law of Ukraine “On Mort-
gage” (Article 17), which does not pro-
vide for such a rule. In that situation, it 
should be guided by the provision of the 
Civil Code of Ukraine (Part 1, Art. 267), 
according to which the obligation on 
which the statute of limitations has ex-
pired is valid but without compulsory 
court protection (natural obligation).
In that regard, it is necessary to note 
the inconsistency of P. D. Guivan’s posi-
tion on this issue. Thus, comparing the 
statute of limitations and the truncated 
period, the author states on one page of 
his book that the statute of limitations, 
as well as the truncated period, deter-
mines the time for realization of certain 
substantive legal authority, and the ex-
piration of these periods leads to the sub-
jective substantive law being extin-
guished [7, p. 200], and on another page 
[7, p. 213] is in solidarity with 
O. V. Shovkova [10] in that the violated 
civil right does not terminate with the 
expiration of the limitation period, which 
is confirmed by the legislative fixing of 
the possibility of fulfilling the obligation 
included in the obligation composition, 
after the statute of limitations (part 1 
Article 267 of the Civil Code), and that 
only the possibility of court protection 
of the right is extinguished, that is, the 
protection obligation is terminated, the 
content of which includes the claim of 
the empowered person.
Thus, at all stages of the mechanism 
of legal regulation of civil relations, pe-
riods and terms as legal categories reflect 
their regulatory influence on the behav-
ior of participants in these relations.
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